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A RELEASE OF ONE JOINT TORT-FEASOR AS A RELEASE OF ALL.
In the recent case of Duly v. Connecticut Co.,' the defendant
pleaded a formal release given to the Ley Company by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was engaged as an employee of the Ley
Company, which corporation was engaged in doing work for and
upon the premises of the Connecticut Company. The injury to
the plaintiff was caused by electricity with which the structure
upon which he was working had become charged. The court
held that as the release included a reservation of the right to
sue any other party or parties for the same injury, and nowhere
recognized the consideration received to be complete satisfaction,
such release should be given the effect of a covenant not to sue
in order to comply with the intent of the parties, and that there-
fore the Connecticut Co., though a joint-feasor with the Ley
Company, was not also released.
192 AtI. (Conn.) 883.
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The opinion of the court contains an exhaustive review of the
authorities on this question. As therein brought out, there are
two groups of cases: The one holds that the technical language
of the release prevails, and that a reservation of the right to sue
others of the joint tort-feasors or other indications that full
satisfaction has not been received, being repugnant to the legal
effect of a release, must be ignored; the other disregards the
technical form of the release, and holds that one must look to the
true intent and meaning of the parties, and that such language,
being repugnant to the idea of a technical release, prevents it
from operating as such and renders it a covenant not to sue. This
second group is the more reasonable and equitable, and more in
accord with the modern theory that mere technicalities should not
prevent the true intention of parties to an instrument from being
fulfilled.
It is submitted that there are cases in which such a reservation
is repugnant, not only to the technical language, but also to the
true intent of the parties, and its effect should be nullified. This
occurs where the release is given to that one of two joint tort-
feasors against whom the other tort-feasor has a right of con-
tribution or indemnity. Manifestly, the true intent of the parties
is to render the releasee immune from all further claims on the
part of the releasor arising out of the injury in question, whether
such claims be directly or indirectly asserted. If, therefore, we
construe the release as a covenant not to sue, and allow suit to be
brought against the other tort-feasor, the latter can turn to the
released party and demand contribution. Thus the effect, and the
intended effect of the release, would be frustrated. Generally
this would not occur. "There is no contribution between joint
tort-feasors." But this general rule does not apply in certain
classes of cases.
The rule has been held inoperative in order that the ultimate
loss may be visited upon the principal wrong-doer, where one less
culpable, although legally liable to third persons, may escape the
payment of damages by putting the ultimate loss upon the one
principally responsible for the injury done.2 This is illustrated
in numerous cases where a municipal corporation has been
allowed to recover over the amount of damages for which it has
been held liable in consequence of a defective street, occasioned
'Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., i96 U. S. 217.
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by the neglect or failure of another to perform his legal duty.3
Likewise where the plaintiff was legally bound to keep a sidewalk
reasonably safe, and the defendant obstructed it whereby a third
party was injured, it was held that they were not in pari delicto-
that the plaintiff's neglect to keep the sidewalk safe did not make
the plaintiff a joint wrong-doer with the defendant, in any such
sense as to prevent the plaintiff from recovering- over of the
defendant whatever damages he had been forced to pay the
injured party.4 So where a gas company negligently performed
its duty to keep its pipes in a safe condition, and thereby damage
occurred, it was allowed to recover over of a traction company,
whose negligent excavation had caused the leak.5 In these cases
both parties have been guilty of a tort to third parties and as to
them are joint-feasors. But the liability of one has arisen from
the positive acts or omissions of the other, and not by its own
active participation or knowledge and assent. As between them-
selves, the active wrong-doer stands in the relation of an indem-
nitor to the person who has been held legally liable therefor.8
"The liability which results from the mere omission of a legal
duty is to be distinguished for the purpose of this case (i. e., to
recover indemnity) from that which results from personal parti-
cipation in an affirmative act of negligence, or from a physical
connection with an act of omission by knowledge of, or acquies-
cence in it, on the part of the defendant."7
A distinction is also made between the negligence of one party
which brings about a condition, and the negligence of another
party in not recognizing and acting upon such condition. As to
an injured party, they are joint tort-feasors, but as between
themselves the former may recover over of the latter. As
between the two negligent parties, the negligence of the active
perpetrator of the wrong is the proximate cause of the injury
to the party whose negligence did no more than to produce the
'City of Bowling Green v. Bowling Green Gaslight Co., 112 S. W.
(Ky.) 917; Washington Gas Co. v. District of Columbia, I61 U. S. 316;
Hamden v. N. H. and Northampton Co., 27 Conn. 158; Baltimore &
0. R. Co. v. County Conrs, 77 Ati. (Md.) 93o; Dillon ort Municipal
Corporations, §1035.
'Old Colony Railroad v. Slavens, 148 Mass. 363. See also Churchill v.
Holt, 127 Mass. 165; Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149.
'Phila. Co. v. Traction Co. et al., 165 Pa. 456.
' Scott v. Curtis, 195 N. Y. 424.
"Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creet, 92 N. Y. Supp. 855.
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condition.8 In New Hampshire, this question of whether, as
between the joint tort-feasors, the negligence of the one seeking
indemnity may be regarded as a remote cause or condition of the
injury, and the negligence of the other as the proximate cause
thereof, has been determined by the application of the doctrine
of last clear chance.
A master who has been held liable for the negligent acts of
his servant upon the doctrine of respondeat superior may recover
indemnity from the servant for whose negligence he has
responded. 10 But where the master's own negligence has con-
curred with that of his servant, no right of contribution exists."
So too, an employer may recover of his contractor, by whose
negligence he has, without fault of his own, been compelled to
pay damages. 1 2 "In negligent cases based not upon wilful wrong-
doing, but growing out of legal duties and obligations, a clear
distinction must be drawn between the liability of the party pri-
marily negligent and that of one secondarily so to the extent of
being liable to a third party injured. In such a case, it is well
settled that the second party, while he may not escape liability to
the third party injured, may hold the first party, primarily
negligent, for indemnity.' 13
In the principal case it does not appear from the statement of
facts whether the negligence was that of the Connecticut Co., or
was primarily that of the Ley Co., being imputed to the Con-
necticut Co. Should it appear that the Ley Co., was primarily
negligent, a release given to them should operate to discharge the
Connecticut Co., despite the reservation of the right to sue, as,
in accordance with the above cases, the Connecticut Co., would,
if sued, be entitled to claim indemnity from the Ley Co.
Finally, though we construe this release to be a covenant not
to sue, the fact remains that it is in reality a release. What the
court does is to abrogate the well-settled rule that a release for
a consideration of one of several joint tort-feasors is a release
'Austin El. Ry. Co. v. Faust, 133 S. W. (Tex.) 449.
'Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & N. R. Co., 62 N. H. 159;
Boston & M. R. Co. v. Brackett, 71 N. H. 494.
"Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244; G. T. Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177.
' Central Ry. Co. v. Macon RS. & Light Co., 9 Ga. App. 632.
'Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Pigott, 1I6 S. W. (Tex.) 841;
Maxwell, S. & Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., i Tenn. Ch. 8. See also Eaton
& Prince Co. v. Trust Co., Ioo S. W. (Mo.) 551.
"Pa. Steel Co. v. Wash. & Berkeley Bridge Co., 194 Fed. ioli.
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of all. The concurring opinion of Judge Wheeler recognizes that
this is in fact judicial legislation, disguised though it be by the
mantle of "construction." To quote from his opinion: "This
rule of law (that a release of one is a release of all) was estab-
lished by the courts because it then seemed to bring about what
should be done according to the then established judgment of
society. . . . Time has proved that the rule is wrong in principle
and in its operation promotes injustice. . . . It is better that the
rule should be changed, rather than modified by exceptions which
are sustained by a forced construction of men's agreements ...
That court best serves the law which discards the old rule when
it finds that another rule of law represents what should be accord-
ing to the settled and established judgment of society ...
Change of this character should not be left to the Legislature."
That this open assertion would stagger the opponents of judi-
cial legislation is without question. The power of the judges to
make law has been a source of much controversy. The state-
ments of Lord Esher that "there is in fact no such thing as
judge-made law,"'14 that "once conclude that such was always
the law, and it follows that it is the common law, that law would
not and cannot be altered by mere judicial decision but only by
Act of Parliament,"'" and the statement of Brett that "the judges
cannot make new law by new decisions, they do not assume a
power of that kind; they only endeavor to declare what the
common law is and has been from the time it first existed"' 6 have
long since been exploded. Such statements were termed by
Austin, "the childish fiction employed by our judges, that judi-
ciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous
something made by nobody, existing from eternity." 17 That the
common law is in fact almost entirely of judicial origin is now
well recognized. 18 The controversy at the present day is as to
whether the judges should continue to legislate, or whether they
should confine themselves entirely to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the law as they find it, and leave the making of new
law and the abrogation of outgrown law to the legislature.
"In Willis v. Bradley, 2 Q. B. D. 324.
"In Cockrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. D. 74.
"In Munster v. Lamb, ii Q. B. D. 599.
"Austin's "Jurisprudence," p. 655. See also Street's "Foundations
of Legal Liability," p. 498.
1 Tuttle v. Buck, 1O7 Minn. 145; Pollock's "First Book of Jurispru-
dence," p. 24o; Allen v. Jackson, i Ch. 399 (1875); McKelvey on Evi-
dence, §40; Pomeroy's "Equity Jurisprudence," §69.
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No man, perhaps, has denounced judge-made law so severely
and unsparingly as Bentham.19 Such statements as those of Lord
Esher he branded as "a wilful falsehood having for its object
the stealing of legislative power by and for hands which could
not, or durst not, openly claim it." There was nothing he so
detested as judge-made law, and he would abrogate it, root and
branch, by a declaration that there should be no enforceable rules
outside the code. "One of the fundamental doctrines of Ameri-
can constitutional jurisprudence is that the exercise of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers is to be vested in separate
and independent organs of government. ... The judicial depart-
ment cannot assume the performance of functions essentially
legislative. Although the judiciary has endeavored to avoid the
assumption of legislative power, under the English system of
judicial interpretation, in some cases, the inevitable result is
judicial legislation. '20
Should the judiciary, as advocated by Judge Wheeler, broaden
the statute, 2 a which provides that the discharge of one of several
joint debtors shall not discharge the others, so as to change the
rule as to tort obligations? This kind of judicial legislation has
been rightly criticized. Mr. Justice Harlan in the Standard Oil
case said, "I am impelled to say, that there is abroad, in our
land, a most harmful tendency to bring about the amending of
constitutions and legislative enactments by means alone of judicial
construction." The courts should not attempt to change the law
as laid down by the legislature but should leave such changes to
the body which enacted the law.
The rule as to releases was laid down as part of the common
law-the work of the judiciary. It was evolved by them as being
the then expression of the people's will. If the legislature fails
to see that it is now outgrown and should be changed, the
judiciary should take it upon itself to change it. Nor should it
resort to the cloak of "construction" or the equally obnoxious
"broadening" of the statutes. That such an attitude is necessary
is exemplified in the establishment and growth of the courts of
equity. To-day, as then, judicial legislation is needed to prevent
the law from becoming antiquated.
"See Carter, Law, its Origin, Growth, and Function, pp. i8o, 205.
"The Balance and Delegation of Governmental Powers," by E. D.
Martin in The American Law Review, Vol. 27, number 5, P. 715.
'a General Statutes, §655.
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We must recognize that the law is in a constant state of
progress. As the ethical and moral ideals, of the nation change,
so must the laws, the expression of these ideals, change. The
judges, by their training and by their constant contact with the
law are best fitted to give expression and effect to the people's
will. They are far less liable than the legislature to be swayed
by political influence, and far less liable to be misled by the press
and the biased and extreme views of agitators.21 "The study
bf justice leads to the love of justice, and they are the first to
recognize and sanction the improving customs of life."22 "Nor
is there any danger in allowing them that power which they have
in fact exercised, to make up for the negligence or incapacity of
the avowed legislator. That part of the law of every country
which was made by judges has been far better made than that
part which consists of statutes enacted by the legislature."
23
In making these changes the judges should move slowly.
Radical or abrupt changes should be left to the legislature. But
the judges should endeavor to keep the law abreast of the times.
When a rule of the common law is found to be antiquated, when
it no longer brings about justice as conceived and desired by the
people, then the judges, in the absence of help from the legis-
lature, should discard the rule and formulate one more in accord-
ance with the needs of the present hour. It is only in this way
that respect and reverence for the law can be maintained, for
the people cannot respect or reverence that which does not
represent the ethical and moral standards of their age.
24
LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND QUASI
CORPORATIONS FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM
NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTAINING
PUBLIC PARKS.'
There is a considerable conflict of authority on this topic.2
According to the somewhat strict view obtaining in New Eng-
"Judges as Law Makers," by C. T. Bonaparte, 23 Green Bag, 507.
' Carter, Law, its Origin, Growth, and Function, pp. 324, 335.
'Austin, Jurisprudence, p. 224.
" See "The Law and the Judges," by A. L. Corbin, Yale Review, Jan-
uary, 1914.
' See comment on the liability of a municipal corporation for negligence
in the administration of its duties in 20 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 571.
225 Harv. Law Rev. 568.
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land, which has come down from Russell v. Men of Devon3 and
the statement of Ashurst, J., that "it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience," there is no liability of either towns or cities for
injuries resulting from negligence in maintaining public commons
or parks, the only duty in the premises being a corporate duty
imposed for the public benefit.4 In some jurisdictions, however,
there is liability on the part of a municipal corporation where
the duty was imposed with its consent.5 But an act of the
legislature changing a town into a city has not been considered
as enlarging civil remedies for neglect of corporate duty.6 The
majority of courts, on the other hand, hold that a municipal
corporation is liable in this respect.7 Some adhere to this view
on the ground that the parks are the private and exclusive
property of the city, in which the state, as distinguished from the
municipality, has no property interest whatever ;8 others, on the
ground that where the state imposes a ministerial duty on a
distinct municipality or where such duty arises from the common
relations of life, it must be carefully discharged.9 Probably the
best statement of the ground for this holding is that "the city
has entered into relations which are within the scope of private
law, namely, control and ownership of property, and it should
be subject to the obligations usually attending such relations;"
for, although the property is held for a public purpose, the cor-
poration does not act as an agent for the government and is not
clothed with sovereignty in respect to it.10
Although this class of cases falls within the range of the
broad term "governmental" as formerly applied by way of dis-
tinction from that class arising from the activities of a municipal
32 T. R. 661, 667.
"Clark v. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567.
'Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. i.
'Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332.
' Cahon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264; Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270,
7 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. lO42, 114 Am. St. Rep. 158, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
147; Pennell's Advn'r v. Wilmington, 7 Pen. (Del.) 229; De Agramonte
v. Mount Vernon, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 717; Silverman v. New York,
114 N. Y. Supp. 59; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St. log; District
of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 540; Barnes v. District of Columbia,
9, U. S. 540.
'Denver v. Spencer, supra.
'Pennell's Adm'r v. Wilmington, supra.
10 25 Harv. Law Rev. 646.
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corporation as a private owner, nevertheless these cases arise
from activities carried on primarily for the benefit of the inhabit-
ants of the particular locality not strictly governmental in their
nature and better denominated municipal functions, as distin-
guished from purely governmental functions on the one hand and
private commercial functions on the other.11 Liability on the
part of a municipal corporation in respect to them is desirable
and in accord with public sentiment.12 - Nor is there any apparent
reason why liability under this head should not extend as well
to towns which, at the present time, in almost all instances, have
corporate capacity and the power of taxation. Counties, though
created by the legislature for the purpose of a more convenient
and distributive administration of government, and clothed with
some of the attributes of sovereignty, are liable for torts, where
there is a direct injury to property rights, on the ground that
even a branch of the sovereign power cannot be created free
from liability for the violation of the constitutional rights of
individuals, notwithstanding the injury results from the exercise
of a governmental function 13 So much more should towns be
liable for negligence in the exercise of their municipal func-
tions. They hold property in much the same manner as cities
do for municipal purposes. The town common to all intents
and purposes is as much the exclusive property of the town as
the parks are of the city, and the state certainly has no more
property interest in the one than in the other. The mere fact
that towns have not in the past been charged with liability for
negligence in the exercise of this municipal function should not
be an insuperable objection to holding them liable in the future.
The holding in Russell v. Men of Devon14 does not apply to any
public body having a corporate fund, or the means of obtaining
one.1 5
'Beale's Cases on Municipal Corporations, 6ol.
I5 Harv. Law Rev. 736, 737.
is 22 Harv. Law Rev. 54.
1 4 Supra.
'Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., 1639.
